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Stereotyping Patients
Katherine Puddifoot
1. Introduction
There is a burgeoning psychological literature indicating that health profes-
sionals are influenced in their clinical judgment and decision making by implicit 
biases. Implicit biases are automatic and unintentional associations that are made 
between members of particular social groups (racial, gender, socioeconomic, and 
so on) and certain traits (e.g., laziness, greed, athleticism, and so on) or affective 
responses (i.e., positive or negative affectivity).1  When automatic stereotyping 
occurs through the operation of implicit bias, people are associated with par-
ticular traits in virtue of their social group membership rather than their other 
personal characteristics. This stereotyping has been found to influence the judg-
ment and decision making of health professionals, leading to differential medical 
outcomes. The quality of care that patients receive can be determined in part by 
their social group membership and the associations that are made with their so-
cial group by those responsible for patient care.
The operation of implicit biases can thus bring substantial ethical costs , lead-
ing health professionals to treat their patients in ways that are unfair and unjust. 
Ethical principles of justice and fairness demand that differential outcomes are 
eradicated (see, e.g., Matthew 2015). They demand that people are treated equally, 
and given equal access to high-quality health care, without stereotypes about the 
social groups to which they appear to belong impacting upon the care that they 
receive. Ethical demands thus prima facie favor interventions that prevent health 
professionals from being responsive to the social group status of their patients in 
their clinical judgment and decision making.
However, it can be crucial to successful clinical judgment and decision mak-
ing that health professionals are responsive to the social group status of their pa-
tients. Certain conditions are significantly more prevalent in some social groups 
than others. For health professionals to make correct clinical judgments, they 
need to reflect the prevalence of medical conditions across different groups. In 
addition to this, health professionals who engage in interactions with their pa-
tients that are required to obtain the information required to make correct diagno-
ses and treatment decisions will often discover their social group status. For these 
reasons, it seems that with respect to epistemic  goals, gaining true belief, knowl-
edge, or understanding about patients’ conditions, health professionals should  be 
responsive to their patients’ social group status.
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At face value, then, there is a conflict between ethical goals and the epistemic 
goals. Several philosophers have argued that people can face an ethical–epistemic 
dilemma with respect to implicit bias (Kelly and Roedder 2008; Gendler 2011; 
Egan 2011; Mugg 2013; cf. Madva 2016 and Puddifoot 2017): people who make 
the ethical choice to respond in an egalitarian way can suffer epistemic costs be-
cause their judgments will not reflect the distribution of traits across a population. 
Health professionals seem to face a dilemma of precisely this kind. They can 
achieve the ethical goal of responding in an egalitarian way by treating their pa-
tients the same regardless of their social group status, but they will consequently 
suffer epistemic costs. Alternatively, they can achieve the epistemic goal of doing 
the thing that is most likely to produce correct clinical judgments by reflecting 
their patients’ social group status in their clinical judgment and decision making, 
but thereby suffer ethical costs, failing to meet principles of justice and fairness.
In this article, I argue that although it is highly intuitive this is an oversim-
plified view. This is because there can be ethical gains from what is, prima facie , 
the best thing from an epistemic perspective. Meanwhile, and more surprisingly, 
there can be epistemic costs associated with what initially seems to be the best 
from an epistemic perspective: Even when the social group status of the patient is 
relevant to a judgment about her condition, recognition of her social group status 
can bring substantial epistemic costs.
My claim is not that health care providers should be unresponsive to the 
social group status of their patients, for example, having patient files with infor-
mation about social status removed. We shall see that such a strategy would have 
serious negative consequences for precisely those who could otherwise be the ob-
ject of stereotyping. Instead, I aim to show that the only way to avoid substantial 
epistemic as well as ethical costs is to tackle the problem of implicit bias head-on 
so that health care professionals can respond to the social group status of their 
patients without consequently making the significant errors that currently follow 
from stereotyping. However, tackling the problem of implicit bias in health care 
will be especially difficult because some of the automatic associations which 
produce epistemic costs can be crucial to facilitating accurate diagnostic and 
treatment decisions.
2. Implicit Bias and Health Care
Let us begin by exploring how ethical principles seem to demand that health 
professionals are not responsive to the social group status of their patients when 
engaging in clinical judgment and decision making. The reason for this is appar-
ent on considering the burgeoning empirical literature on implicit bias in health 
care.
As implicit biases are automatic and unintentional responses, they can influ-
ence the judgment that a person makes without the person intending for them to do 
so. Mere awareness of the social group status of an individual can make a person 
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respond to them in a way that is fitting with a stereotype of the individual’s social 
group. In other words, implicit bias can make people engage in automatic and 
unintentional stereotyping, where stereotyping is defined in the following way:2 
Stereotyping: making a judgment about an individual that is influenced by a mental state 
associating members of a group, to which that individual is perceived as belonging, more 
strongly than members of other groups with particular traits.
It has been found that health professionals are often prone to implicit biases, asso-
ciating their patients with certain traits due to their social group status, and these 
associations can influence the judgments they make about the patients and their 
conditions. Based on the empirical findings, it seems as if implicit biases influ-
ence assessments of pain, the quality of clinician–patient interactions, treatment 
choices, and which conditions are considered to provide a plausible explanation 
of a patient’s condition.
Evidence that health professionals’ assessments of the pain of their pa-
tients can be influenced by implicit biases is found in a study undertaken by 
Vani Mathur et al. (2014). These authors found that experimental participants 
implicitly primed with a picture of a Black face prior to considering a case study 
perceived and responded to the pain described in the study less than those who 
were implicitly primed with a White face. Meanwhile, Adam Waytz, Kelly Marie 
Hoffman, and Sophie Trawalter (2015) measured the extent to which White par-
ticipants engaged in implicit super-humanization of Black people, that is, implic-
itly associating them with superhuman qualities. They found that Black people 
were more strongly associated with superhuman qualities than White people and, 
correspondingly, were less likely to be thought to require pain medication.
Another set of studies focuses on the quality of the physician–patient interac-
tion, suggesting that it can be determined by the implicit racial bias harbored by 
the physician. In a study undertaken by Lisa Cooper and colleagues (2012), phy-
sicians’ implicit racial bias, and their bias associating members of different races 
with compliance or noncompliance, were measured alongside their behaviors in 
physician–patient interactions. Where physicians were found to have higher levels 
of implicit bias associating Black people with noncompliance, the dialogue be-
tween the patient and the physician was rated by a third party as less patient-cen-
tered. That is, the patient was given less opportunity to speak. Similarly, Irene 
Blair et al. (2013) measured primary care clinicians’ implicit bias, finding that 
two-thirds displayed a bias favoring Whites more than Blacks and Latinos. They 
then surveyed patients who had regular contact with those clinicians over a pe-
riod of on average three years, asking for their ratings of the clinicians. They 
found that Black patients’ ratings of their clinicians’ patient-centeredness were 
predicted by the strength of the clinicians’ implicit preference for Whites over 
Blacks (see also Penner et al. 2010; Hagiwara, Kashy, and Penner 2014).
There is strong evidence that implicit biases like these influence treatment 
choice. In an early study on implicit bias in health care, high levels of negative 
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implicit bias toward Black people predicted low levels of recommendation of 
thrombolytic drugs to Black patients (Green et al. 2007). In a more recent study, 
Jacqueline Nolan et al. (2014) explored the reasons for discrepant rates of cervical 
cancer screenings and follow-up care for Black women in Massachusetts in the 
United States. They surveyed Black women from a variety of backgrounds and 
found that they tended to explain the discrepant treatment by appeal to uncon-
scious biases, with some citing a physicians’ desire not to touch them as a reason 
why they were given inadequate care. In another study, undertaken by Diana 
Burgess et al. (2014), male physicians were found to be less likely to prescribe 
opioids to Black patients than White patients when under a condition of cognitive 
load, in which they were required to complete a memory exercise under time 
constraints while responding. It has previously been found that implicit biases are 
more likely to manifest under conditions of high cognitive load, time pressures, 
and high stress (Bertrand, Chugh, and Mullainathan, 2005; White, 2014). It is 
therefore highly plausible that the discrepant prescription choices were the result 
of the operation of implicit bias.
A final set of findings suggests that implicit biases can also determine which 
conditions are considered in a diagnostic process. Gordon Moskowitz, Jeff Stone, 
and Amanda Childs (2012) primed medical doctors with images of African 
American or White faces, which they were shown at speeds so fast that they were 
not aware that they had been shown images at all. Then they engaged in a catego-
rization task. They were presented with words and required to categorize them as 
either names of diseases, names of treatments or as neither. Their reactions times 
were measured and compared. The doctors were significantly faster to respond 
to diseases stereotyped as African American (in an earlier study of some doctors’ 
knowledge of diseases strongly associated with African Americans) when they had 
been shown an African American face than when they had been shown a White 
face. The results reveal a priming effect: exposure to faces of African Americans 
decreased response times to diseases stereotyped as more strongly associated with 
African Americans seemingly because the recent exposure to the faces primed 
the participants to think about the stereotypical diseases. This strongly suggests 
that the doctors automatically associate some diseases more strongly with African 
Americans than others. It also suggests that health professionals who associate 
particular social groups with certain conditions are likely to apply the stereotypes 
regardless of whether or not they intend to. On mere exposure to members of the 
social group, conditions that are associated with the group will be made more 
cognitively accessible to the health professionals, so they are more likely to auto-
matically attribute the symptoms of the patient to the condition.3 
Taken together, these results provide compelling evidence that health profes-
sionals’ engagement in automatic and unintentional stereotyping can influence the 
judgments they make about their patients.4  Whether a patient is treated well or 
badly, and whether or not they get treatment appropriate to their needs, can depend 
upon the associations made by their health care provider with the social group(s) 
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to which the patient is perceived as belonging. There is clearly a strong case for 
saying that this is an unethical outcome, violating principles of justice and fairness 
in an area of life that is crucial to health, well-being, and even survival.5  Because 
the stereotypes leading to these negative outcomes operate automatically once a 
health professional is responsive to the social group status of their patients, there is 
reason for thinking that it will be ethically costly, that is, it will reduce the chance 
of health professionals acting fairly and justly, if they are responsive to the social 
group status of their patients in their clinical judgment and decision making.
3. Medical Conditions and Social Groups
It might seem, then, that interventions should be developed to prevent health 
professionals from being responsive to the social group status of their patients, 
so that they base their judgments wholly on the symptoms that the patient de-
scribes and the testimony that they provide about their medical history. However, 
this section will show that information about the social group status of patients 
can be highly relevant to medical judgment and decision making and a crucial 
determinant of whether or not a correct judgment is made. Moreover, for health 
professionals to gain the information that they require to make accurate clinical 
judgments and decisions they will often need to be placed in a situation in which 
they will inevitably become aware of and respond to the social group status of 
their patient. Therefore, substantial epistemic costs would be incurred if health 
professionals were placed in a situation in which they were not likely to be re-
sponsive to the social group status of their patients.
To understand the first of these points, consider how medical conditions 
are often unevenly distributed across social groups. For instance, hypertension, 
coronary heart disease, osteoarthritis, diabetes, and certain types of cancer are 
more commonly found among obese people than underweight, normal weight, 
or overweight people (Sturm 2002). People of low socioeconomic status in some 
countries are more vulnerable than members of other social groups to certain 
conditions such as tuberculosis, HIV-AIDS, and diabetes (Root 2000, cited by 
Sally Haslanger 2004). Meanwhile, as members of certain ethnic and racial 
groups, such as Black people in the United States, are statistically more likely to 
live in poverty, they are more likely than average to have conditions commonly 
found among those from low socioeconomic backgrounds (ibid).
Blacks are seven times more likely to die of tuberculosis than Whites, three times more 
likely to die of H.I.V.-A.I.D.S. and twice as likely to die of diabetes. The diseases are 
biological but the racial differences are not; How is this possible? ... No mystery. Race af-
fects income, housing, and health care, and these, in turn, affect health. Stress suppresses 
the immune system and being Black in the United States today is stressful. (Root 2000, 
S629, cited in Haslangar 2004, 11)
Because medical conditions are not evenly distributed across social groups, if a pa-
tient is a member of a particular social group, they can consequently be significantly 
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more likely than nongroup members to have a particular condition. Under these 
circumstances, both information about the social group membership of a patient 
and information about the prevalence of a medical condition within patient’s social 
group is relevant background statistical information (i.e., base rate information). If 
members of social group A are more likely than members of other social groups to 
have a certain condition C, and patient P is a member of social group A, then P’s 
social group membership is relevant to a judgment about whether they have condi-
tion C. Information about the prevalence of a medical condition can, for example, 
guide judgments about which diagnostic hypotheses are more probable than others. 
If diseases x, y, and z are more common among a patients’ social group than other 
diseases, and a patient displays symptoms consistent with x, y, and z, the patient 
is more likely to have one of these diseases than some other disease, all else being 
equal. Health professionals cannot devote equal time and attention to all possible 
diagnostic hypotheses. This means that they are more likely to identify the correct 
diagnosis of a patient’s disease if they focus on specific, probable, diagnostic hy-
potheses. If diseases x, y, and z are significantly more common among a social group 
than other diseases, then the diagnostic hypothesis that a patient of the social group 
has one of the diseases will be probable relative to the probability that the patient has 
another disease. The health professional who responds to the social group status of 
her patient by reflecting the information about the distribution of the diseases among 
the patient’s social group in her diagnostic judgments can therefore be more likely 
to identify the correct diagnosis for the patient than a medical practitioner who does 
not do so. A health professional who does not reflect information about the distri-
bution of medical conditions across different social groups in her clinical judgments 
might consider a large and varied range of diagnostic hypotheses. However, without 
a restriction on the scope of conditions considered to reflect the social group mem-
bership of a patient, the health professional is likely to fail to consider some clinical 
hypotheses that are highly likely given a patient’s social group membership because 
she will be considering very many hypotheses that are less probable.
In some scenarios, information about the social group membership of a pa-
tient will be equally if not more diagnostic than information about their symp-
toms and medical history. Take a patient from a low socioeconomic background 
in a city in which there has been a high incidence of lead poisoning in areas of 
high deprivation due to poor housing conditions. Lead poisoning is difficult to 
diagnose and the symptoms of the condition can also be indicative of a number 
of other conditions (for example, some key symptoms are high blood pressure, 
difficulties with memory and concentration, headaches). A health professional 
could have knowledge of the symptoms and medical history of the patient without 
considering lead poisoning as a plausible explanation of those things. Meanwhile, 
knowledge of the social group status of the patient might lead her to quickly con-
sider that the patient has lead poisoning.
To see the second point, consider how the process of gaining the information 
needed to make correct diagnostic and treatment decisions will frequently require 
direct communication between health professionals and patients and sometimes 
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also a physical examination by the health professional of the patient. If either 
of these interactions happen, then the health professional is likely to discover at 
least some of the social group statuses of their patients, from their appearance, 
accent, and so on. This means that it will not be possible to do what is required 
to make correct diagnostic and treatment decisions without occupying a situation 
in which the social status of the patient is apparent. As has been noted above, 
mere recognition of a person’s social status can lead to an automatic response. 
Therefore, it will often not be possible to get the information required to make 
correct diagnostic and treatment decisions without automatically responding to 
the social status of one’s patient.
In sum, health professionals who are responsive to the social group status of 
their patients are often significantly more likely to make correct clinical judg-
ments. For this reason, it seems that if one is concerned with health professionals 
achieving epistemic goals , like making accurate judgments about the medical 
conditions of their patients, then one ought to accept that it is important for health 
professionals to be responsive to the social group status of patients.
4. Ethical–Epistemic Dilemma?
At this point, there appears to be good reason to believe that there is a ten-
sion between ethical and epistemic goals that must be addressed by those aim-
ing to improve clinical practice. Ethical principles seem to dictate that health 
professionals’ responses to patients are not determined by the patients’ social 
group status. In contrast, the achievement of epistemic goals seems to require 
that health professionals be influenced by the social group status of their patients 
when making judgments about their condition and care. The subsequent sections 
show that things are not this simple. First, health professionals frequently cannot 
act ethically in their clinical judgment and decision making without responding 
differentially to patients based on their social group status. Second, responding to 
a patients’ social group membership can bring substantial epistemic costs, so is 
not wholly good from an epistemic perspective.
5. How the Epistemically Best Option Can Be Ethical
This section focuses on showing that health professionals cannot act ethically 
without responding differentially to patients based on their social group status. In 
other words, the achievement of ethical goals requires what initially appeared to 
be the best thing from an epistemic but not an ethical perspective, that is respond-
ing to the social group status of a patient. People who adopt the role of medical 
practitioner take on the responsibility of identifying and responding to patients’ 
clinical needs. Once they take on this responsibility, the ethical goal of treating 
people fairly demands that they do all that they can within reasonable limits to 
make accurate judgments about their patients’ needs. If they are more likely to 
make correct judgments by being responsive to the social group status of their 
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patients, responding differently in their judgments of members of different social 
groups, then there can be an ethical demand on them to do so. The ethical goal 
of treating people fairly can therefore sometimes only be achieved via the fulfill-
ment of the epistemic goal of making a correct judgment. Where the epistemic 
goal requires reflecting the social group status of a patient in their judgments, 
there can be an ethical demand on health professionals to be responsive to social 
group status.
To see this point more clearly, consider the inadequacy, in the current con-
text, of the response made by Andy Egan (2011) to the claim that people can face 
a dilemma with respect to implicit bias. Egan accepts that ethical and epistemic 
principles clash and responds by arguing that people should be willing to make 
inaccurate judgments in order to treat people fairly. Egan’s suggestion is in a long 
tradition of arguments to effect that epistemic goals can be overridden for sake 
of other goals (Code 1987), but it is unsatisfactory in the current case. A medi-
cal practitioner who takes the risk of making an inaccurate clinical judgment in 
order to be egalitarian could rightly be accused of negligence, failing to meet the 
responsibilities of her post. She could fail to achieve ethical goals by neglecting 
epistemic goals.
6. Epistemic Costs of Responsiveness to Evidence
Perhaps it is not surprising that health professionals can be required, by prin-
ciples of justice and fairness, to do all that they can to ensure that they make 
correct clinical judgments and treatment decisions. What is likely to be more 
surprising is that responding to facts about a patients’ social group membership 
can bring substantial epistemic costs. Moreover, these costs can be wrought even 
where information about social group membership is relevant to a patient’s clini-
cal diagnosis and treatment.
As we have already seen, health professionals who are sensitive to the social 
group status of their patients are likely to engage in implicit stereotyping. This 
section shows how this implicit stereotyping can bring significant epistemic costs . 
In this discussion, as in others (see, e.g., Bortolotti 2016; Puddifoot and Bortolotti 
2018), x is viewed as viewed as epistemically costly if, as a consequence of x, 
one is less likely to achieve certain epistemic goals, including acquiring new true 
beliefs, retaining and using relevant information, increasing the coherence of a set 
of beliefs, and gaining understanding (Puddifoot and Bortolotti 2018).6  My claim 
is therefore the following: responding to the social group status of a patient can 
bring substantial epistemic costs. These are the epistemic costs that often follow 
from implicit stereotyping.
Let us begin by considering how a medical practitioner is likely to respond 
in a way that is influenced by implicit bias if she is sensitive to social group sta-
tus of a patient. The empirical evidence cited in Section II shows that responses 
influenced by implicit biases often occur. Moreover, studies like the Moskowitz 
et al. (2012) study, also cited in Section II, strongly suggest that mere exposure 
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to a prime associated with a particular social group (e.g., racial group) can lead 
a medical practitioner to consider some diagnostic hypotheses and clinical treat-
ments rather than others due to them making implicit associations with members 
of that social group.
It is not surprising that implicit biases influence clinical judgments given 
that the conditions of contemporary health care mean that health professionals 
frequently face extremely heavy workloads, which they have to complete under 
significant time limitations, while undergoing stress and suffering from exhaus-
tion (Stone and Moskowitz 2011; Byrne and Tanessini 2015). Under these types 
of conditions, people tend to depend on implicit forms of cognition, which oper-
ate quickly and automatically (Byrne and Tanessini 2015). They can depend on 
associative patterns of thought rather than thinking in a controlled, deliberate 
manner (ibid.). In other words, they can automatically depend on stereotyping 
without having the time and opportunity to engage in other forms of reasoning 
and decision making.
Whether or not they intend it to be the case, then, health professionals who 
respond to the social group status of their patients can engage in automatic ste-
reotyping of those patients. The following epistemic costs of responding to social 
group status of a patient are ways that a medical practitioner can be less likely to 
achieve particular epistemic goals due to the operation of these stereotypes.
A first epistemic cost is that where the stereotype that is applied associates a 
patient with negative characteristics, a health professional can fail to give adequate 
attention and credibility to the testimony of the patient. Negative stereotypes, 
like the stereotype that obese people lack will power , can lead health profession-
als to communicate less effectively with a patient, giving the patient less time 
and opportunity to explain their symptoms and generally making the patient less 
comfortable explaining their condition. Recall the findings discussed in Section 
II about the poor quality of interactions between physicians and patients when 
the physicians are influenced by implicit biases relating to the group(s) to which 
their patients belong—for example, the findings suggesting that dialogue is less 
patient-centered when a physician harbors a negative stereotype relating to the 
patient’s social group. These results suggest that where health professionals are 
influenced by negative stereotypes, they are less likely to enter into productive 
dialogue with their patients, listening to the details that they can provide about 
their condition. They can fail to give the details that the patient provides about 
their condition appropriate credibility due to a stereotype they associate with the 
patient’s social group, demonstrating what Miranda Fricker (2007) calls testimo-
nial injustice  (see also Carel and Kidd 2014). When people are negatively stereo-
typed they can also choose to smoother their testimony, choosing not to provide 
information to people who they believe will not engage in appropriate uptake of 
it (Dotson 2011). Within the health care setting, this testimonial smothering  can 
manifest as patients choosing not to disclose information about themselves, their 
symptoms, and their medical history, because they believe that the information 
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will be either ignored or misinterpreted by their physician who they perceive to 
be negatively stereotyping them. Each of these phenomena can be costly because 
many medical practices are fundamentally aimed at soliciting and receiving 
knowledge via testimony from a patient. Health professionals aim to understand 
this information, critically evaluate it, and give appropriate weight to it. If they 
engage in stereotyping, however, they are less likely to access, appropriately eval-
uate, or give appropriate weight to it.
A second epistemic cost of implicit stereotyping is that a medical practitioner 
can focus on characteristics of a patient (i.e., symptoms and aspects of medical his-
tory) that fit stereotypes associated with the patients’ social group—for example, an 
unhealthy lifestyle in a person with low socioeconomic status—giving inadequate 
attention to non-stereotypical characteristics. This is because people have a general 
tendency to notice and attend to stereotypical characteristics more than non-stereo-
typical characteristics (Rothbart, Evans, and Solomon 1979; Srull, Lichtenstein, 
and Rothbart 1985). People also have a general tendency to build explanations that 
are consistent with stereotypes when other explanations would fit better with the 
available information (Duncan 1976; Sanbonmatsu, Akimoto, and Gibson 1994). 
Health professionals who are responsive to the social group status of their patients 
are therefore likely to explain some medical symptoms by appeal to stereotypes, 
for example, poor lifestyle choices in members of certain social groups, even when 
more adequate explanations of the information of the symptoms and medical his-
tory displayed, for example, in terms of genetic factors, are available.
It might be thought that errors of the type just described can be avoided if 
health professionals only focus on the relevant information about the social group 
status of their patients—the statistical information about the distribution of med-
ical conditions across a population—and are not be influenced by stereotypes 
associating members of particular social groups with negative characteristics like 
untrustworthiness or poor lifestyle choices.7  It might be thought that if health pro-
fessionals focused only on the relevant information then their responsiveness to 
the social group status of their patients would only be positive from an epistemic 
perspective.
There are two problems with this type of response. First of all, psychological 
results suggest that health professionals who are responsive to the social group 
status of their patients, perceiving them as members of a social group, for exam-
ple, a Black patient, an obese patient, or a poor patient, will be highly likely to 
associate those patients with a cluster of characteristics. As noted above, due to 
contemporary conditions in health care, they are likely to depend on implicit ste-
reotyping when they are responsive to social group status in this way. According 
to dominant theories about the psychology of stereotypes, any act of stereotyp-
ing will associate an individual with a cluster of characteristics and not one (see 
Puddifoot 2017). This means that if health professionals rely on stereotypes to 
associate members of social groups with medical conditions, they will also con-
sequently associate those individuals with numerous other characteristics (Blair, 
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Ma, and Lenton 2001, cited in Moskowitz et al. 2012). Some of these associa-
tions will be epistemically costly. For example, if the stereotype that an African 
American patient is more likely than other patients to have sickle cell anaemia is 
triggered, the general stereotype of an African American patient is likely to be 
triggered, including an association between African American patients and un-
cooperativeness (Green et al. 2007). Health professionals influenced by the latter 
association can, for instance, fail to give appropriate weight to the testimony of 
African American patients.
The second problem with the suggestion that there could be only epistemic 
benefits if health professionals only focused on the relevant information about 
the statistical distribution of medical conditions across a population is that even 
stereotypes that encode this information can produce epistemic errors.
Sometimes a medical practitioner will depend on a stereotype associating a 
social group more strongly than other social groups with a medical condition and 
the association will fail to reflect reality. For example, the above-mentioned study 
by Moskowitz and colleagues (2012) of medical doctors in the United States 
found that they named thirty-six diseases as stereotypical conditions found in 
African Americans. These included genetically based conditions such as hyper-
tension and sickle cell disease, but also behavior-induced conditions such as drug 
abuse and obesity. The experimenters found that the conditions that had a genetic 
basis did tend to be found more frequently in African Americans. However, the 
conditions induced by behavior were not found at a higher rate among African 
Americans. Drug abuse, for example, was found to be equally frequent among 
White people and African Americans in a 2003 report (Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration 2004, cited in Moskowitz et al. 2012). 
The use of some drugs such as heroin, cocaine, stimulants, or methamphetamine 
was found in a report from 2007 to be higher among the White population than 
the African American population (Office of Applied Studies, Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration 2007, cited in Moskowitz et al. 2012). 
This means that only some of the conditions associated with African Americans 
are more frequently found among the African American population. Whenever 
stereotypes that falsely associate medical conditions more strongly with some so-
cial groups than others are applied, health professionals will give inappropriately 
high levels of attention to certain conditions that they wrongly associate with a 
particular social group, reducing the chance that they make the correct diagnosis.
Epistemic costs can follow, however, even if a stereotype associates members 
of a social group more stronger than others with a particular condition and that 
condition is more prevalent in that social group than others. First of all, the appli-
cation of the stereotype can lead to some diagnostic hypotheses being given undue 
attention and others being given insufficient attention (Moskowitz et al. 2012). 
As mentioned in Sections II and 3, when a stereotype is applied in the process 
of diagnosis it influences the hypotheses considered by the health professional 
because certain conditions are more likely than others to be brought to mind as 
potential explanations of the patient’s condition (ibid). As noted in Section III, this 
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can be beneficial, leading the health professional to focus attention on more rather 
than less probable explanations of a patient’s symptoms. For example, if a patient 
is Black, they are statistically more likely to have hypertension than members 
of other racial groups, and in fact highly likely to have the condition (41 percent 
of the Black population in the United States have hypertension compared to 27 
percent of the White population) so it could be beneficial for a health professional 
to place hypertension high on the list of conditions that they consider when Black 
patients present with symptoms consistent with the condition. The stereotype will 
affect the “space of theoretical possibilities” that the health professional is primed 
to consider, which could be a positive thing if the space of possibilities that is con-
sidered both reflects the statistical distribution of conditions across different pop-
ulations and is sufficiently broad. However, the same phenomenon can be costly 
under other conditions. Given the time pressures that health professionals operate 
under, the number of potential hypotheses that can be considered is severely lim-
ited. This means that they will often be susceptible to failing to formulate the cor-
rect clinical hypothesis. The application of a stereotype associating members of 
certain social groups with particular medical conditions can greatly increase the 
chance that the health professional will fail to give adequate attention to non-ste-
reotypical clinical hypotheses because many hypotheses will be missed. Under 
these circumstances, health professionals are likely to fail to consider clinical hy-
potheses that would yield a correct diagnosis.
The application of the stereotype can also have a distorting effect on the 
way that a health professional perceives the symptoms of a patient. As mentioned 
above, stereotypes determine what information people attend to; people some-
times attend to and remember information that confirms their stereotypes but 
not information that disconfirms them (Rothbart et al. 1979; Srull et al. 1985). In 
the medical setting, this can manifest as health professionals focusing on symp-
toms of the patient that are indicative of conditions that they associate with the 
patient’s social group than other social groups, failing to give adequate attention 
to symptoms of a patient that do not fit the stereotype. For example, a health 
professional might attend closely to symptoms that fit hypertension when diag-
nosing an African American patient but fail to attend to symptoms that do not fit 
hypertension, or symptoms that better fit an alternative diagnosis. Even where 
a stereotype reflects the statistical reality, of the high prevalence of a condition 
within a social group (such as hypertension among the Black population), it can 
have a distorting influence, reducing the chance of correct judgments being made 
about some patients (i.e., those with conditions that are not stereotypical).
The health professional is not likely to only attend to symptoms that are con-
sistent with the patient having hypertension, or another stereotypical condition, if 
they display with symptoms that are clearly unrelated to a stereotypical condition, 
for example, a sore elbow. However, there will be many cases where symptoms 
are likely to be missed as a result of stereotyping. Perhaps the patient does not 
disclose information about a symptom but would provide information that would 
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indicate the presence of the symptom if asked the correct questions, or the pres-
ence of the symptom would be revealed if the correct tests were undertaken. Or 
perhaps a symptom is not easily quantifiable, such as pain, so cannot easily be 
conveyed to the medical practitioner. Under such circumstances, if the practi-
tioner engages in stereotyping of social groups and conditions, psychological re-
sults suggest that they are susceptible to failing to notice or attend appropriately 
to the symptom if it is not stereotypical, to failing to ask the correct questions 
or undertake the tests necessary to reveal the presence of the symptom. Even if 
a stereotype that is applied reflects a genuine correlation between a condition 
and a social group (e.g., hypertension and the Black population), applying the 
stereotype can nonetheless provide an impediment to effective clinical diagnosis 
by preventing the practitioner from noticing and properly attending to what can 
be more predictive information: about non-stereotypical symptoms that provide a 
strong indication about which condition is present.
Even if it were the case that a health professional were to notice and attend to 
all relevant symptoms there could still be epistemic costs that follow from apply-
ing a stereotype about the types of conditions that members of a social group are 
likely to have. This is because generally when people apply stereotypes (Duncan 
1976; Sagar and Schofield 1980), including automatically and unintentionally 
(Devine 1989), they are disposed to interpret ambiguous behavior displayed by 
the target of the stereotyping in a way that is fitting with the stereotype, where 
the behavior should be viewed as ambiguous. In the health care setting, this phe-
nomenon can manifest as health care professionals interpreting ambiguous symp-
toms in ways that are consistent with stereotypical conditions being present. For 
example, if a Black person has a symptom that is ambiguous between a number of 
different conditions, but could be viewed as indicative of hypertension, the health 
care professional is likely to interpret the symptom as providing a higher level of 
support for hypertension as the correct clinical diagnosis than other conditions 
that the symptom is compatible with. This is epistemically costly because the 
correct response to ambiguous evidence is to treat it as ambiguous.
It might initially seem puzzling how it could be harmful from an epistemic 
perspective for health professionals to interpret symptoms that are ambiguous 
between different conditions in a way that is consistent with a person having a 
condition that is prevalent among their social group. And in some cases, a con-
dition might be so highly prevalent in a particular population in contrast to other 
conditions that the presence of a symptom that might under other circumstances 
indicate other medical conditions provides a good indication of the presence of 
the stereotypical condition. For example, in a population with extremely high 
levels of the Ebola virus, fever-like symptoms might strongly indicate the pres-
ence of Ebola, so that it is beneficial for a medical professional to interpret fever, 
which would otherwise be an ambiguous symptom, as indicative of the virus. 
Here are two responses that can be made to these objections. First, if a condition 
is sufficiently prevalent in a population it is not clear that symptoms consistent 
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with the condition should be viewed as ambiguous. If sufficiently many people 
within a population have Ebola, the presence of a fever might be taken to provide 
unambiguous, if not inconclusive, evidence in support of the conclusion that a 
particular person has Ebola.
Second, if a symptom S is truly ambiguous between conditions x, y, and z, 
then each of conditions x, y, and z should be weighted as more probable than it 
would otherwise be due to the presence of S, unless there are some other good 
reasons for thinking that one of the conditions is not present. To see this point, 
it will be useful to compare it to a criminal case. There are three suspects of a 
crime: Johnston, Robertson, and Thompson. Some evidence is found suggesting 
that the criminal was wearing a red jumper. Each of the three suspects is known 
to have been wearing a red jumper at the time of the crime. The appropriate 
response to the evidence about the jumper is to weight as more probable each of 
the options: that Johnston is guilty, that Robertson is guilty, and Thompson is 
guilty. There might be independent reasons for thinking that one of the suspects 
is guilty, but the presence of the red jumper should not be interpreted in a way 
that is consistent with that suspect being guilty, if it is truly ambiguous. Instead, 
the evidence that each of the suspects wore a red jumper should be considered 
alongside, but independently of, other evidence suggesting that one of the sus-
pects is guilty. Otherwise, the other evidence that supports the conclusion that 
the suspect is guilty is influential twice over, in a case of “double book-keeping”8  
because it influences the way that the evidence about the red jumper is inter-
preted. Similarly, if there are three conditions that are consistent with a particular 
symptom, evidence that a symptom is present should lead each of the conditions 
to be taken equally more seriously as potential explanations of the symptoms. If 
there is some independent reason for thinking that one of the conditions is more 
likely than the others to be present, because it is prevalent within the patient’s 
social group, then this evidence should be considered independently but alongside 
the presence of the symptom. Otherwise, the fact that the condition is prevalent 
within the patient’s social group is influential twice over, once again in a case of 
“double book-keeping.”
This section has thus identified numerous epistemic costs that are associated 
with responding to the social group status of a patient even where information 
about the social group status of the patient is relevant to judgments about their 
condition. Health professionals who respond to information about their patients’ 
social group status tend to engage in stereotyping, associating the patients with a 
cluster of characteristics. They can consequently fail to give some patients appro-
priate opportunity to communicate information about their condition; they can 
attend closely to stereotypical features while failing to attend to non-stereotypical 
features; they can fail to give adequate attention to certain medical hypotheses, 
and so on.
The fact that some of these epistemic costs can occur as the result of an 
automatic association between social groups and medical conditions when the 
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association reflects the reality of the distribution of conditions across different 
social groups highlights a particularly serious problem for those who aim to in-
crease the chance that health professionals achieve their epistemic goals. The 
problem is this: it will not be possible to prevent health professionals from making 
all of the stereotypical associations that bring epistemic costs without preventing 
them from making an association that it is extremely valuable for them to make.
7. In Place of the Ethical–Epistemic Dilemma
Evidence of implicit bias in medicine initially appeared to present an epis-
temic–ethical dilemma, but now it is clear that the situation is even more com-
plex. The goal of treating patients in an ethical manner will often require being 
responsive to information about their social group status, that is doing what was 
initially thought only to be required in order to achieve one’s epistemic but not 
ethical goals. Only by being responsive to this information can health profession-
als discharge their duty of doing all that they can to ensure that their patients get 
appropriate treatment. But being responsive to this information can bring sub-
stantial epistemic costs due to the operation of stereotypes. Therefore, what ini-
tially seemed to only bring epistemic benefits—responding to the social status of 
patients—brings a mixture of epistemic costs and benefits.
It might seem that due to the epistemic costs associated with being respon-
sive to the social group membership of patients, and consequently stereotyping, it 
would be better if health professionals were denied information about the social 
group membership of their patients. For instance, they could be required to make 
diagnostic and treatment decisions based on blinded patient files lacking details 
about social status. However, as discussed in Section III, health professionals 
often need to communicate directly with and engage in physical examination of 
patients to gain the information that is required to make correct diagnostic and 
treatment decisions. Moreover, correct judgments and decisions will often depend 
upon knowledge of the social group status of patients, wherever conditions are 
unevenly distributed across social groups.
It is worth adding to these observations that those groups that are most sus-
ceptible to being negatively stereotyped will often be those that would suffer the 
most if patient files were blinded, or other methods were used to prevent health 
professionals being aware of their patients’ social group status. Members of mi-
nority, stigmatized, and marginalized groups are most likely to be stereotyped 
by their health professionals, so it might seem that they would benefit the most 
from, for example, patient files being blind. However, the prevalence of condi-
tions within their social groups are least likely to be represented in the default 
norms explicitly or implicitly used in diagnosis where social group status is not 
taken into consideration. As the probability that they will have a condition is not 
likely to be represented in default norms, they are most likely to be misdiagnosed 
if their social group status is not recognized. This is because the default norms 
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that do not reflect the prevalence of conditions within their group will be applied 
to them.
There are therefore numerous very good reasons not to conclude on the basis 
of the observation that there are epistemic costs associated with responding to 
the social group status of patients that health professionals should be denied the 
opportunity to respond to social group status.
It remains likely that, due to the vast number of substantial epistemic costs 
associated with responding to a patient’s social group status that were outlined in 
Section VI, there are occasions when health professionals would be more likely 
to make correct judgment if they were unaware of the social group membership 
of their patients. However, it is an open empirical question how often this will 
be the case. And for any given clinical encounter, it will be extremely difficult 
to identify if it would be better for the health professional to be unaware of the 
patient’s social status. It will be especially difficult for a health professional to 
make an assessment of whether they should remain unaware of a patient’s social 
status without becoming aware of their social status. Therefore, given the impor-
tance of the interactions between patients and health care professionals that lead 
to acknowledgment of the patients’ social status, it would be unwise to advise 
that practices like introducing blinded patient files should be adopted to prevent 
health professionals from responding to their social group status.
What should be done instead? In order to ensure that health professionals 
can achieve both (i) their ethical goals of treating patients justly and fairly, dis-
charging their duty to their patients, and (ii) their epistemic goals of making cor-
rect clinical judgments and decisions, it will be necessary to reduce the extent to 
which stereotypes negatively influence their judgments once they are aware of 
a patient’s social group status. Often in discussions of implicit bias and stereo-
typing the strategy of preventing people from being aware of the social status of 
group members against whom they might be biased is viewed as promising (see, 
e.g., defenses of making CVs anonymous).  But this strategy would be detrimental 
in the types of cases currently under discussion.
Other strategies have been advocated to prevent the negative effects of im-
plicit bias and stereotyping. Strategies that focus on changing the psychologies 
of individuals have been proposed. For example, it has been argued that consid-
ering counterstereotypical examples (e.g., strong women) (Blair et al. 2001) can 
change one’s stereotypes, thereby changing the associations that are made when 
stereotypes are triggered in response to individuals. And it has been proposed 
that developing implementation intentions or “if-then plans” that specify how one 
will respond to a specific stimuli can change one’s responses to individuals, con-
trolling the association that is triggered in response to an individual (e.g., Stewart 
and Payne 2008; Madva 2016). For example, the implementation intention “if I 
see a Muslim then I will think PEACE” could alter one’s responses to individual 
Muslims. These and other methods to combat implicit stereotyping have been 
found to be effective under experimental conditions (Lai et al. 2014), although 
their effectiveness, when administered within the experimental setting appears to 
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be short-lived (Lai et al. 2018), so there is reason to doubt that their effects will 
be significant outside the experimental setting.
Some of those who are skeptical about the effectiveness of individualistic 
strategies focus on structural features of society (see, e.g., Anderson 2013). For 
example, attempts might be made to increase integration of members of different 
social groups (ibid.). Increased integration can reduce the negative biases associ-
ated with certain social groups. It can, for instance, ensure that people encounter 
counterstereotypical members of other social groups consistently over time rather 
than for a limited amount of time within an experimental setting. The hope is 
that through increased integration, and other methods of social change, the ste-
reotypes that people harbor are likely to be challenged and change accordingly.
There remains significant debate about which, if any, of these methods are 
effective at preventing people from automatically and unintentionally engaging in 
stereotyping. What the argument in Sections 1–6 shows is that, if some strategies 
are established to be effective at combating the negative effects of this stereotyp-
ing, this could facilitate health professionals achieving both their ethical and epis-
temic goals. But the argument presented so far also highlights a significant and 
unexpected challenge that is faced by those hoping to ameliorate medical practice 
by tackling implicit bias in health care. This is because the current discussion 
suggests that the ideal strategy to use to tackle the negative effects of stereotyping 
in health care would not eliminate altogether the implicit biases that have been 
found to manifest in health care. It would not even eliminate all of the implicit 
biases that bring substantial epistemic costs. Instead, it would lead people to con-
trol rather than eradicate some of these stereotypes: that is those relating social 
groups to medical conditions. Why should these stereotypes be controlled rather 
than eliminated? Because associating social groups with medical conditions, 
where the association reflects the distribution of conditions across social groups, 
can facilitate the quick and efficient selection of a correct clinical hypothesis.
Until control of this sort is taken over the automatic and unintentional ste-
reotyping engaged in by health professionals, they are unlikely to achieve either 
their ethical or epistemic goals to the full because they will not be able to respond 
quickly and efficiently to what is important and relevant information—about 
their patients’ social status—without suffering epistemic costs that reduce the 
likelihood that they will make correct diagnosis and treatment choices.
It might be that at least a partial solution to the problem of medical profession-
als being susceptible to stereotyping which leads to ethical and epistemic costs is 
relatively easy to enact. Research suggests that people are able to correct for the 
effects of stereotypes if they have time to do so. In a recent study, for example, 
people were primed with an image of a Black face and then asked to judge another 
image of a face according to how threatening it was (Rivers et al. 2018). When 
participants had a longer interval between having the stereotype of Black people 
as threatening activated by the prime and making the judgment of threat, they were 
less likely to apply the stereotype to the face that they were judging. The lengthier 
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interval between exposure to the prime and judgment seems to have provided the 
opportunity for participants to correct for the effect of the activation of the threat 
stereotype. What this suggests is that, if people are serious about improving the 
chances of health professionals achieving both (i) the ethical goal of treating pa-
tients justly and fairly, thereby discharging their duty, and (ii) their epistemic goals 
of making correct diagnostic and treatment decisions, then providing more time 
for these professionals to do their job could be an excellent place to start.
8. Conclusion
At first glance, there is an ethical–epistemic dilemma that is faced by those 
concerned with improving conduct in health care. There will be ethical costs if 
people are responsive to their patients’ social group status because they will be 
susceptible to being influenced by implicit bias, engaging in stereotyping, and 
providing unfair treatment. However, if they are not responsive to their patients’ 
social group status they will suffer epistemic costs associated with failing to 
gather and apply relevant evidence: specific evidence relating to the social group 
status of their patients, and evidence (e.g., about symptoms or physical signs of 
a condition) that could only be gathered through the kinds of interactions that 
would reveal the social group status of their patients.
What this article has illustrated, however, is that ethical costs follow if health 
professionals are unresponsive to their patients’ social group status. If informa-
tion about social group status is relevant to judgments about the likelihood that a 
person has a particular condition, and about appropriate treatments, then health 
care professionals can only fulfill their duty of care to their patients if they are re-
sponsive to this information. Meanwhile, there can be substantial epistemic costs 
associated with being responsive to patients’ social group status. If one harbors 
implicit stereotypes relating to a patient’s social group, which are triggered in the 
process of diagnosing and prescribing treatment for the patient, then one is likely 
to respond in a biased way to evidence that they might provide: failing to provide 
the patient with the opportunity to communicate information about their condi-
tion, failing to attend to non-stereotypical symptoms, failing to give attention to 
non-stereotypical medical hypotheses, and so on. Some of these epistemic costs 
can even follow due to the application of a stereotype even if it accurately reflects 
the distribution of medical conditions across social groups. What this means is 
that it can be an ethical choice to be responsive to a patient’s social group status, 
and this ethical choice can also be good from an epistemic perspective, but it can 
also bring substantial epistemic costs.
What is the way out of this problem? It cannot prevent health professionals 
from being responsive to the social group status of their patients because health 
professionals who are not responsive to the social group status of their patients 
are unlikely to gather the information they need to make correct diagnoses and 
treatment choices. To improve both the ethical and epistemic dimensions of 
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clinical judgment and decision making, it will therefore be necessary to tackle 
the stereotyping operational in implicit bias head-on. Strategies to tackle implicit 
bias and stereotyping so far have been found to have some, limited effectiveness. 
Structural changes to society might be required to make further progress. One 
seemingly simple strategy that psychological studies suggest might be effective 
is giving health professionals more time to engage in clinical judgment and de-
cision making—a point that seems particularly powerful with current conditions 
in health care in which people are often working under severe time constraints. 
Tackling implicit bias in health care effectively will be especially difficult be-
cause some of the stereotypes that are automatically activated in the health care 
context—that is those correctly associating members of social groups more 
strongly than others with particular conditions—can bring significant epistemic, 
and therefore ethical, benefits. Ideally their influence would therefore be con-
trolled rather than eradicated. But whatever method turns out to be most effective, 
the current discussion shows that by effectively tackling implicit bias in health 
care it will be possible to reduce both ethical and epistemic costs, increasing the 
chance of health professionals achieving both ethical and epistemic goals.
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Notes
1There has been a large amount of discussion about how exactly implicit biases should be character-
ized (see, e.g., Schwitzgebel 2010; Gendler 2011; Mandelbaum 2016; Levy 2015; Holroyd and 
Sweetman 2016). These debates do not have to be settled for current purposes. My claims relate 
to what can be concluded about the ethical and epistemic costs and benefits of implicit biases giv-
en what experimental studies say about them, and particularly and how they operate, regardless 
of their metaphysical status.
2There are alternative definitions of stereotyping according to which stereotypes always have a dis-
torting effect on judgments (Blum 2004). However, I adopt the view of stereotyping most often 
found within recent social psychology, that stereotyping is any act that involves associating an 
individual with certain characteristics in virtue of their social group membership, regardless of 
the accuracy of the association. For a defense of this approach to stereotyping, see Beeghly 2015.
3The Moskowitz et al. (2012) study measures automatic associations rather than behavioral manifesta-
tions of bias (see note 2 for potential concerns about this), but it nonetheless strongly suggests that 
health professionals will be biased in their diagnoses because the order in which thoughts about 
conditions are manifest will determine the order in which they will consider clinical hypotheses
4Doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of one main measure of implicit bias—the implicit 
association task (IAT)—for example, about whether it measures biases or recognition of attitudes 
or patterns found in one’s society, and about whether high levels of “bias” as measured by the 
IAT correlate with real-world behaviors. Some of these studies measure implicit biases using the 
IAT should therefore be treated with caution by those skeptical about this measure. However, the 
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studies discussed in this overview of the literature on implicit bias in medicine use a variety of 
measures, including measuring patterns of treatment under conditions in which implicit cognition 
tends to dominate (Burgess et al. 2014) and gathering testimony from Black female patients about 
their lived experience of bias (Nolan et al. 2014). The latter methodologies have not received the 
same criticism as the IAT. In fact, there is increased recognition of the importance of the latter 
source of evidence, that is, testimony of those who have experienced prejudice and discrimination 
(Holroyd and Puddifoot forthcoming).
5For further discussion of the psychological research on implicit bias in health care, see Matthew 
(2015). For a philosophical discussion, see Fitzgerald (2014).
6This list of epistemic costs is not supposed to be exhaustive.
7Dana Bowen Matthew (2015) seems to suggest that it is possible to make a division between being 
influenced by relevant information about social group status and being influenced by stereotypes.
8Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion to put this point in this way.
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